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It is often stated that mind-reading, or the ability to attribute and reason about 
other’s mental states, is a cognitive prerequisite for communication (Clark 1996; 
Levinson 2006; Wilson & Sperber 2012; Scott-Phillips 2014; Tomasello 2008). 
One foundational argument for this is that the code model of communication 
fails to account for how hearers access speaker meaning. Alternatives to the 
code model focus on identifying speakers’ intentions, and so require mind-
reading. This argument is very rarely questioned, but it is deeply problematic. 
First, the ‘classic’ code model, where signals are associated with meanings 
in a simple dictionary-like way, does not even account for all cases of animal 
communication. If this is true, then it is hardly surprising that it also fails to 
account for some human communication, (and presumably we would not want 
to conclude that animal communication also requires mind-reading). A more 
plausible code model of animal communication is required if it is to be a 
genuine target.  
At least some animal communication uses intentionally produced signals 
that rely on complex and probabilistic codes, where signal interpretation is 
sometimes context-sensitive (e.g. Roberts et al. 2012). Importing context-
sensitive coding into the code model is crucial, as makes it possible for 
interpretation of signals to depend on a range of socially and ecologically 
important inputs. These inputs can include prosody, speaker’s line of sight and 
current activities, non-mentalistic goal recognition, and emotion recognition. 
Complex decoding processes can also rely on pragmatic presumptions, such that 
it is worthwhile to pay attention to utterances directed towards oneself (e.g. 
marked by sustained eye contact), and that utterances are easy to decode. In this 
‘broad’ code model, communication is tied to existing ways of successfully 
interacting with others, and can be done in a way that does not rely on mind-
reading.   
  
 
However, if the claim is that animal communication (code-like) is 
qualitatively different to human communication (not code-like), given the broad 
code model, it is not entirely clear what the qualitative difference is. Clearly, 
there is a lot that the broad code model cannot do. But the broad code model 
makes it possible to identify speaker meaning across a range of contexts that are 
likely to be ontogenetically and phylogenetically important, including deictic 
signals. If this is the case, then it looks like mind-reading is not always 
necessary for engaging in context-sensitive and pragmatically informed 
communication.  
There is a further problem though. If one views all cognition as essentially 
coding/decoding information, then any model of human communication will be 
a code model at some level of description. Even if mind-reading turns out to be 
essential for human communication, an information processing model of mind-
reading would be part of a larger code model of communication. Yet mind-
reading remains a black box, making it difficult to evaluate exactly when and 
how it contributes to communication. It is not clear what online and stored 
inputs are selected and used, and how and which inferences are generated. 
Further, related to similar debates about animal mind-reading, there are thorny 
questions about what counts as ‘genuine’ mind-reading, compared to any other 
process that uses perceptual cues and stored information to predict and explain 
behavior. So, even if mind-reading is claimed to be part of a larger code-model 
of communication, it is currently very unclear what process it refers to. 
Following Buckner (2014), it is unlikely that there is a clear-cut answer to 
this, but he provides an interesting perspective on how to approach mind-
reading. Buckner follows a Dretskian analysis of representational content and 
suggests that an agent is more along the continuum of being able to mind-read, 
or represent mental states, the more able they are to integrate information 
concerning the candidate mental state in question (and act accordingly), and the 
better they are able to learn novel cues that mark the presence of that candidate 
mental state. That is, mind-reading is not an all-or-nothing capacity, but a 
graded capacity to engage in certain kinds of cognitive processing (and ones in 
which adult humans do not always excel).  
Given this gloss on mind-reading however, it is even less clear what 
necessity claims about mind-reading in the context of communication amount 
to, because mind-reading is not a single, monolithic capacity. Instead, it seems 
likely that different types and levels of mind-reading, at different levels of 
complexity/flexibility, will be necessary for more or less successful engagement 
with specific types of communicative acts. In this case though, not only is one of 
the foundational arguments in favour of the necessity of mind-reading for 
human communication deeply flawed, but claims about the necessity of mind-
reading for human communication are at best massively underspecified, and at 
worst cognitively implausible. 
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